I queried OpenAI’s ChatGPT to research Cognitive Warfare here is what it came up with. Here is a link to the original query and response, you will need to scroll down the page a bit past a coding question i asked it before this,
AI chatgpt generated report, https://chatgpt.com/share/67e082db-d5b8-8003-b2dd-2f4a9f1ac816
Research completed in 17m · 53 sources
Cognitive Warfare conceptually turns the human mind into a battlefield, targeting perceptions and decision-making as directly as traditional warfare targets physical assets. Cognitive warfare is an emergent form of conflict that uses information and psychology to “alter the cognition of human targets”, often without those targets’ awareness
innovationhub-act.org
. Unlike conventional kinetic warfare, which relies on physical force, cognitive warfare operates in the intangible realm of beliefs, emotions, and decisions. Its primary goals are to destabilize and to influence – in essence, to “get the enemy to destroy himself from within” by manipulating perceptions and behavior
innovationhub-act.org
innovationhub-act.org. Through coordinated campaigns of propaganda, disinformation, social engineering, and even neurobiological means, cognitive warfare seeks to compel adversaries to act in the aggressor’s interest “without a single shot being fired.” This report provides a detailed overview of cognitive warfare, focusing on the role of automation and artificial intelligence (AI) in its conduct, operational applications in both military and civilian spheres, human–machine teaming and neurotechnological integration, and the attendant ethical, legal, and policy implications.
Defining Cognitive Warfare and Key Frameworks
Cognitive warfare has been described as “an unconventional form of warfare that uses digital information tools to alter enemy cognitive processes, exploit mental biases or reflexive thinking, and provoke thought distortions, influence decision-making and hinder actions”
innovationhub-act.org
. In other words, it deliberately targets how people perceive, think, and decide, treating perception as a weapon
moderndiplomacy.eu. This concept overlaps with but goes beyond traditional information warfare, which focuses on controlling information content. Cognitive warfare targets the process of cognition itself – “what individual brains will do with [the] information” – making “a cognitive effect not a by-product of action, but its very objective”
innovationhub-act.org. As Claverie and du Cluzel (2022) note, cognitive warfare “extends beyond the human consequences of cyber warfare”, integrating cyber means with psychological and social techniques to directly affect the human mind
innovationhub-act.org
innovationhub-act.org. NATO’s Allied Command Transformation similarly defines cognitive warfare as activities to “affect attitudes and behaviors, by influencing, protecting, or disrupting…cognition, to gain an advantage over an adversary,” effectively making “human cognition…a critical realm of warfare”
act.nato.int
act.nato.int.
Key differences from related concepts: Cognitive warfare is related to psychological operations (psyops) and information operations, but it is broader in scope and ambition. Traditional psyops often deliver overt (white) or covert (black) propaganda to influence targets, typically in military contexts. In contrast, cognitive warfare leans heavily on “gray” tactics – ambiguous in origin and deniable – aimed at whole societies
innovationhub-act.org
innovationhub-act.org. It does not rely on overt attribution or immediate tactical outcomes, but on subtle, cumulative effects on public opinion and decision-making. Unlike pure cyber warfare, which *“only” targets computer systems, cognitive warfare targets the human element behind those systems, “utilizing similar tactics [as cyberattacks]…but spreading malevolent information” rather than malware
innovationhub-act.org
innovationhub-act.org. In short, while cyber warfare disrupts infrastructure, cognitive warfare disrupts understanding
researchgate.net. It also blurs the line between military and civilian targets, often encompassing “whole-of-society manipulation” in pursuit of strategic goals
act.nato.int
act.nato.int. For example, a cognitive attack might involve injecting false narratives into social media to erode public trust, as seen in Russian influence campaigns to “decay public trust towards open information sources” during the Ukraine conflict
act.nato.int.
Frameworks for understanding cognitive warfare have been proposed to classify its goals, methods, and domain. One such framework is the UnCODE system (Ask et al., 2024), a neurocentric taxonomy of cognitive warfare objectives. UnCODE stands for Unplug, Corrupt, disOrganize, Diagnose, Enhance, representing five qualitatively distinct categories of adversarial goals
researchgate.net
researchgate.net. In this model, an attacker might aim to: (1) “Unplug” – eliminate the target’s ability to receive or generate information (for instance, silencing or isolating them)
researchgate.net; (2) “Corrupt” – degrade the target’s information-processing capacity (e.g. through fatigue, confusion, or technical interference)
researchgate.net; (3) “disOrganize” – bias or distort the target’s inputs and outputs, essentially introducing systematic errors or false perceptions
researchgate.net; (4) “Diagnose” – monitor and understand the target’s cognitive state and patterns (a reconnaissance step to enable tailored manipulation)
researchgate.net; or (5) “Enhance” – improve the target’s cognitive capabilities, perhaps to exploit them (for example, feeding someone empowering information or technology to guide their actions favorably)
researchgate.net. Notably, the UnCODE framework is “species-agnostic” – it considers both human and non-human cognition as potential targets
researchgate.net. This acknowledges that modern adversaries might also attempt to manipulate machine cognition (such as AI systems’ decision loops) alongside human minds. For instance, corrupting the data inputs of an opponent’s AI decision support system can bias its recommendations – a form of cognitive warfare against a non-human “cognitive” target.
Another important conceptual tool is the analogy to the kill chain framework pioneered in cyber operations. In cybersecurity, Hutchins et al. (2010) introduced the “intrusion kill chain”, describing the stepwise phases of a cyber attack (reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command-and-control, and actions on objectives)
lockheedmartin.com
. The kill chain highlights that disrupting any step can break the attack. By extension, analysts have begun to consider a cognitive kill chain: the phases an influence operation or cognitive attack might progress through – for example, target analysis (reconnaissance of sociopsychological vulnerabilities), content creation (weaponization of narratives or deepfakes), dissemination (delivery via media channels or bots), penetration of audience mindshare (exploitation of attention and trust), consolidation (installation of false beliefs or confusion), command-and-control (sustaining engagement and steering the narrative), and ultimately behavioral or political effect (actions on objectives). Identifying these stages enables defenders to devise countermeasures at each phase, analogous to cyber defense
smallwarsjournal.com
smallwarsjournal.com. Indeed, “intelligence-driven” cognitive defense – anticipating adversary campaigns and preempting their narratives – is increasingly seen as crucial, just as threat intelligence is in cyber defense
smallwarsjournal.com
smallwarsjournal.com.
There is also debate around whether cognitive warfare constitutes a distinct “Cognitive Domain” of warfare. Traditionally, NATO and militaries recognize five domains: land, sea, air, space, and cyber. With the rise of cognitive operations, some strategists argue for formally acknowledging a sixth domain focused on the human brain and perception
innovationhub-act.org
. Proponents like Le Guyader (2022) suggest that the cognitive domain overlaps with all others but merits its own doctrine and focus
scholar.google.com. However, others caution that carving out a separate human or cognitive domain may be conceptually flawed. Ask and Knox (2023), for instance, “take the perspective that a ‘human domain’ does not align with the trajectory of neuroscience and human evolution” in warfare
sto.nato.int. Human cognition is an inherent factor in all domains, they argue, and cognitive warfare by nature permeates and transcends domain boundaries. Rather than a standalone domain, cognitive warfare is an integrative layer that exploits the linkages between physical actions, information, and human thought. This report will use the term “cognitive domain” as a useful shorthand, while recognizing the ongoing debate about its delineation.
The Role of AI and Automation in Cognitive Warfare
Modern cognitive warfare is deeply intertwined with automation and artificial intelligence. On the one hand, AI provides powerful new tools for conducting influence operations at scale; on the other, it introduces new targets (AI systems themselves) and challenges for cognitive security. Recent years have seen an explosion of AI-driven propaganda and deception techniques. Adversaries can leverage AI to generate highly persuasive fake content (text, images, video) and deploy botnets – automated accounts mimicking human users – to amplify disinformation, making it increasingly difficult for audiences to separate fact from fiction
moderndiplomacy.eu
moderndiplomacy.eu. For example, in May 2023 an AI-generated image of a fake explosion at the Pentagon went viral on social media; it was convincing enough to briefly cause a dip in the U.S. stock market before authorities debunked it
mwi.westpoint.edu. This incident starkly demonstrated the “catastrophic potential of AI-driven propaganda to destabilize critical systems”
mwi.westpoint.edu.
State actors are actively developing AI-enhanced cognitive warfare capabilities. Russia has incorporated AI into its disinformation “troll farms,” using generative language models to produce more “human-like and persuasive content” for influence campaigns
mwi.westpoint.edu
. In the lead-up to elections, Russian operatives have employed AI to shape social media narratives, aiming to “sway U.S. electoral outcomes, undermine public confidence, and sow discord” – essentially weaponizing AI to magnify the reach and precision of information warfare
mwi.westpoint.edu
mwi.westpoint.edu. China has likewise made AI a centerpiece of its cognitive warfare strategy. Chinese doctrine explicitly refers to “cognitive domain operations”, combining AI with psychological and cyber warfare to achieve strategic effects
mwi.westpoint.edu. By “leveraging AI to create deepfakes, automate social media bots, and tailor disinformation to specific audiences,” China has “enhanced its capacity to manipulate public discourse” on a large scale
mwi.westpoint.edu. One observed outcome is the proliferation of highly realistic fake personas and videos that push pro-China narratives or sow confusion in target countries. These AI-enabled operations are not limited to wartime scenarios; they are continuously underway in the so-called gray zone, eroding adversaries’ societies from within.
Beyond content generation, AI and big-data analytics empower cognitive warfare through micro-targeting and personalization. Algorithms can sift vast datasets (social media profiles, search histories, demographic information) to identify individuals’ beliefs, biases, and emotional triggers. This enables “precise targeting of individuals” with tailored influence – for instance, delivering customized propaganda or conspiracy theories to those most susceptible
moderndiplomacy.eu
moderndiplomacy.eu. During the COVID-19 pandemic, we saw how automated social media manipulation could amplify anti-vaccine misinformation by targeting communities with specific fears. In military contexts, an AI might analyze soldiers’ social media to detect low morale units and then push demoralizing narratives or deepfake orders from their commanders. The integration of AI thus supercharges the classic techniques of propaganda and psyops, making them more adaptive, scalable, and insidious. As one commentator put it, “AI-driven information warfare weapons” are ushering in a “new revolution in military affairs,” with the potential to “manipulate a target’s mental functioning in a wide variety of manners” unless robust defenses are in place
smallwarsjournal.com
smallwarsjournal.com.
AI is not only an offensive tool in cognitive warfare – it is also a target and a battlefield. Modern societies increasingly rely on algorithmic decision-makers (from financial trading bots to military decision aids); these constitute “nonhuman cognition” that adversaries can attempt to deceive or corrupt
researchgate.net
. For example, a rival might feed false data to an AI-based surveillance system so that it misidentifies threats (the equivalent of optical illusions for machines, known as adversarial examples). Or, in an information environment dominated by recommendation algorithms (on platforms like Facebook or YouTube), manipulating those algorithms’ inputs and parameters can effectively “hack” the attention and beliefs of millions. Indeed, a form of AI-on-AI cognitive warfare is conceivable, in which one side’s algorithms battle the other’s for control of the narrative – all faster than humans can follow. As AI “social bots” interact with AI recommendation systems, the information ecosystem can become an autonomous battleground of memetic and narrative contest, with humans as the prize. Researchers have warned that as “AI matures, it will magnify adversarial threat capabilities that maximize the creation of social chaos,” potentially eroding the trust that underpins democratic societies
smallwarsjournal.com.
Defending against AI-enhanced cognitive warfare will likely require AI as well. Detection algorithms are being developed to spot deepfakes, bot networks, and coordinated disinformation campaigns in real time, flagging them before they spread widely. Machine learning can also help identify emerging “narrative attacks” by monitoring online discourse for sudden shifts, injected talking points, or inauthentic patterns
blackbird.ai
blackbird.ai. Ultimately, a sort of autonomous cognitive security may be needed, where AI systems continuously patrol information channels for threats to the public’s mindset – analogous to anti-malware software but for disinformation. However, this raises hard questions (addressed later in this report) about surveillance, free expression, and who controls the filters on information. What is clear is that AI has become a double-edged sword in the cognitive domain: it vastly amplifies both the means of attack and the means of defense. The net impact on the balance of cognitive power between attackers and defenders remains to be seen, but the early indicators – from election interference to viral hoaxes – suggest that open societies face a significant new “cognitive security” challenge in the AI era.
Operational Applications: Military and Hybrid Contexts
Cognitive warfare strategies are being applied across a spectrum of scenarios, from battlefield operations to geopolitical influence campaigns that blur the line between war and peace. In traditional military settings, cognitive warfare techniques are used to undermine enemy morale, decision-making, and cohesion as a force multiplier alongside kinetic actions. For instance, militaries might deploy precision propaganda to convince enemy soldiers that their cause is futile or their leaders corrupt, prompting surrender or desertion. During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, U.S. psychological operations famously broadcast messages to Iraqi troops encouraging them to lay down arms; today, similar efforts could be enhanced with deepfake videos appearing to show Iraqi commanders already capitulating. Militaries are also integrating cognitive effects into operational planning – NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation has studied whether “the human brain is now the ultimate battlefield” and how commanders can incorporate cognitive objectives (like sowing confusion in enemy ranks) into campaign design
innovationhub-act.org
innovationhub-act.org. Offensive cyber and electronic warfare units increasingly coordinate with information operations units: a cyberattack might take down communications (a physical effect), while simultaneously a flood of fake messages on enemy networks creates panic and false orders (a cognitive effect).
Perhaps the clearest military application is seen in Russia’s and China’s doctrines, which explicitly embrace cognitive warfare. Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine combined cyberattacks on infrastructure with relentless disinformation aimed at Ukrainian and international audiences – seeking both to fracture Ukraine’s will to fight and to influence global public opinion to reduce support for Ukraine
act.nato.int
. Russia targeted Ukrainian soldiers with text messages telling them to surrender, and spread false narratives (e.g. staging incidents to accuse Ukraine of atrocities) to sway minds. China’s concept of “Three Warfares” (psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare) similarly emphasizes controlling the narrative and legal justification surrounding a conflict to “achieve victory” before shots are fired
moderndiplomacy.eu
act.nato.int. In a Taiwan contingency, for example, China might launch cyber and cognitive operations months in advance: using social media sockpuppets to stir doubt about U.S. commitments among the Taiwanese populace, deploying deepfake videos of Taiwanese leaders to undermine their credibility, and flooding regional information channels with legal arguments claiming China’s right to act. The goal would be to isolate Taiwan psychologically and politically, “shaping the perceptions of reality” so that resistance seems hopeless
moderndiplomacy.eu. In all these cases, AI automation enables these campaigns to run continuously and adaptively, engaging millions of targets with tailored messages.
Beyond overt conflict, cognitive warfare is now a fixture of gray-zone competition and hybrid threats in the civilian sphere. State and non-state actors use these techniques to achieve strategic aims without triggering a formal war, by attacking the cohesion, trust, and decision-making of societies. One illustrative scenario: an adversary spreads AI-generated rumors of an impending bank collapse in a rival nation, complete with forged “expert analyses” and fake news reports. Within weeks, this psychological operation could spark bank runs and financial turmoil – “undermining the public’s trust in institutions” and accomplishing economic damage that a bombing campaign might achieve, but clandestinely
moderndiplomacy.eu
moderndiplomacy.eu. Real examples abound. Election meddling is a prominent one: from the 2016 US elections onward, foreign influence campaigns have used bots and false personas on social media to polarize electorates, promote extremist views, and erode trust in the electoral process
smallwarsjournal.com
mwi.westpoint.edu. Disinformation in public health (such as the anti-vaccine movement) has been amplified by malicious actors to weaken adversary populations from within. Extremist groups like ISIS have also engaged in a form of cognitive warfare via online recruitment propaganda, using slickly produced videos and social media outreach to radicalize individuals globally. These “narrative attacks” by terrorists aim to inspire “lone wolf” attackers or build support networks – effectively weaponizing ideology through digital channels.
A key characteristic of operational cognitive warfare is that it often targets civilian populations and social fault lines, exploiting existing divisions. Adversaries identify polarizing issues (race, religion, political identity) in the target society and then inject tailored disinformation to inflame tensions. The objective is to “accelerate pre-existing divisions…to pit different groups against each other and increase polarization”
innovationhub-act.org
. This was observed in the Russian Internet Research Agency’s operations, which in the same timeframe ran Facebook groups for both sides of contentious issues in the U.S., from police brutality to immigration, in order to exacerbate conflicts. In democratic nations, where free flow of information is a value, this openness is turned into a vulnerability – an “ungoverned Wild West” in cyberspace that authoritarian rivals exploit
smallwarsjournal.com. Democracies are particularly vulnerable to cognitive warfare because their very strength (open discourse) can be used against them to create chaos and doubt
smallwarsjournal.com
smallwarsjournal.com. By contrast, authoritarian regimes insulate their populations (e.g. China’s Great Firewall), making them harder to influence externally
smallwarsjournal.com. This asymmetry has led NATO and Western officials to call for strengthening societal “cognitive security” and resilience as a matter of national security
smallwarsjournal.com
smallwarsjournal.com. For example, Finland, which faces constant information attacks from Russia, has incorporated media literacy and critical thinking training into its school curricula, an approach credited with inoculating its citizens against propaganda.
In sum, operational cognitive warfare spans a continuum: on one end, it is integrated with military operations to break the enemy’s will to fight and distort their decision loop (e.g. causing commanders to make mistakes based on false info). On the other end, it is a day-to-day strategic competition in the information environment – a constant “battle for hearts and minds” in which state and non-state actors attempt to steer the narratives and beliefs of target populations for strategic gain. As Claverie and du Cluzel put it, “Cognitive aggression is boundless. It can have a variety of objectives and will adapt itself to other strategies being used,” whether territorial conquest, influencing elections, or disrupting social order
innovationhub-act.org
innovationhub-act.org. The next sections explore how emerging technologies and human-machine partnerships are augmenting these cognitive operations, and what ethical/policy issues arise as a result.
Human–Machine Teaming and Neurotechnological Integration
Because cognitive warfare ultimately centers on the human brain, an irony is that technology is both the weapon and the shield, but humans remain the most critical element. Human–machine teaming in cognitive warfare refers to the collaboration of human operators and AI/automation to enhance cognitive operations. This occurs in both offensive and defensive contexts. On offense, propagandists and psychological operators increasingly rely on AI systems to handle the “heavy lifting” of influence campaigns – data analysis, target selection, message personalization, and even automated content creation – while humans provide strategic guidance and ethical oversight. On defense, human analysts partner with AI tools to detect and counter adversary influence. For example, an intelligence analyst might use an AI platform to sift millions of social media posts for disinformation patterns, then use human judgment to craft counter-narratives or truth campaigns. Effective human–AI coordination can dramatically improve the speed and scale at which cognitive operations are conducted or countered. As one NATO report notes, “CogWar takes well-known methods within warfare to a new level by attempting to alter and shape the way humans think, react, and make decisions.”
researchgate.net
To manage this new level, human operators must leverage AI’s data-handling capabilities without losing the uniquely human insight into psychology and culture.
A holistic approach to human–machine teaming is necessary, as highlighted by Flemisch (2023). He argues that cognitive warfare should be seen as a socio-technical system in which human cognition and machine cognition interact dynamically
sto.nato.int
. Flemisch introduced a “holistic bowtie model” of cognitive warfare that maps out how technological agents (AI, algorithms) and human agents (individuals, decision-makers) are interwoven in both attacking and defending cognitive targets
researchgate.net. In this model, technology is not just a tool but an active participant in the cognitive battle – for instance, algorithmic content amplifiers on social media can be thought of as force multipliers on the battlefield of perception. The bowtie metaphor (often used in risk management) implies a structure where threats on one side and consequences on the other are linked by a central event or process; applied here, it suggests that by strengthening human–machine interfaces and trust, one can narrow the “choke point” through which cognitive attacks must pass, thus mitigating their impact. In practice, this could mean designing information systems such that humans remain in meaningful control – e.g. AI flags a suspected disinformation post, but a human moderator decides to remove or label it. If done right, human–machine teams can capitalize on AI’s speed and breadth and human intuition and ethical judgment. If done poorly, there’s a risk of automation bias (over-reliance on AI outputs) or conversely, information overload for human operators.
One emerging area of human–machine teaming is the use of brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) and other neurotechnologies to integrate humans and machines more directly. Advances funded by DARPA and others aim to enable “seamless neural links” whereby soldiers and AI systems could exchange information by direct neural signals
rand.org
rand.org. The goal is to accelerate the Observe–Orient–Decide–Act (OODA) loop in warfare by bypassing slower channels like verbal commands or screen displays
rand.org
rand.org. For example, an intelligence analyst wearing a noninvasive BCI might receive an AI’s threat alert as a mental sensation or visual overlay straight into the brain, shortening reaction time. DARPA’s N3 program (Next-Generation Nonsurgical Neurotechnology) explicitly cites the potential of BCIs to “facilitate multitasking at the speed of thought” and to “interface with smart decision aids” in combat
rand.org
rand.org. In essence, the human brain could be gradually augmented by AI – not just with traditional decision support, but with real-time neural input/output. This promises significant advantages in cognitive warfare: a soldier could be resistant to information overload because the AI filters and feeds only what’s crucial directly to cognition
rand.org
rand.org. It might also allow multiple robotic systems to be controlled simultaneously by one person’s thoughts, as experiments in “swarm control via neural signals” suggest
rand.org
rand.org. However, this deep integration also creates novel vulnerabilities – a “hacked” BCI could literally inject thoughts or alter perception in the user, which is a security nightmare scenario.
Beyond BCIs, neurotechnology integration includes things like neurostimulators, wearables monitoring stress or attention, and neurochemical enhancements. Militaries are investing in understanding and boosting the cognitive performance of their personnel: e.g. wearable EEG devices to continuously assess a pilot’s cognitive workload, or transcranial electrical stimulation to keep special forces alert for longer. China reportedly developed an “Intelligent Psychological Monitoring System” – sensor bracelets that track soldiers’ emotional states and fatigue, alerting commanders if combat troops are losing morale
act.nato.int
act.nato.int. This kind of tech can be double-edged: it helps maintain one’s own forces’ cognitive readiness, but in the hands of an adversary it could be used to identify when enemy forces are psychologically vulnerable (or even to manipulate them if they somehow intercept or hijack such data). The weaponization of neuroscience is an area of increasing concern. DiEuliis and Giordano (2017) argue that gene-editing tools like CRISPR could be “game-changers for neuroweapons” – for instance, by engineering viruses or toxins that selectively attack neural functions
pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov. They posit a “novel—and realizable—path to creating potential neuroweapons” via genetically modified neurotoxins or psychoactive agents that could impair cognition or induce psychological states in targets
pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov. Such neuroweapons blur the boundary between biological and cognitive warfare: a pathogen that induces paranoia or lethargy in a population would effectively serve a cognitive warfare goal through biological means.
The integration of neurotechnology also extends to cognitive enhancement of friendly forces. Modafinil and other nootropics have been used to keep fighter pilots and troops mentally sharp on long missions. Future enhancements could include memory boosters or stress inoculators that improve decision-making under pressure. In the UnCODE framework, this would be seen as the “Enhance” category – potentially enhancing a target’s cognition not to help them, but to steer them (for example, boosting a local leader’s cognitive capacity with better information so that they become overconfident and take bold actions beneficial to the adversary’s plan)
researchgate.net
. While that example is speculative, it highlights that manipulating cognition can involve adding as well as subtracting capabilities.
Finally, some of the more speculative (and controversial) ideas in human-machine cognitive teaming come from the fringes of defense research. “Remote neural influencing” via directed energy (e.g. high-power microwaves affecting brain activity) has been explored as a way to disrupt an enemy’s cognitive functions at a distance
trinedaythejourneypodcast.buzzsprout.com
. Reports of so-called “microwave weapons” causing disorientation (as in the Havana embassy incidents) have raised questions about whether states are already employing such methods to literally impair brain function and induce cognitive confusion. “Reflexive control”, a concept from Soviet-era doctrine, is essentially cognitive warfare by causing an adversary to make decisions against their own interest by shaping their perceptions – today AI could aid in executing reflexive control by micro-targeting decision-makers with exactly the stimuli that will evoke the desired (but harmful) response
trinedaythejourneypodcast.buzzsprout.com. Author M. McCarron (2024) suggests that advanced military powers are even investigating “thought injection” – attempts to insert ideas or impulses into a person’s mind, potentially via subliminal cues or neural interfaces, with AI systems orchestrating these efforts in a tailored way
trinedaythejourneypodcast.buzzsprout.com. While some of these claims verge on science fiction or conspiracy, they underscore a core point: as technology penetrates deeper into the human cognitive domain, the distinction between influencing a mind and physically assaulting it begins to blur. This raises profound ethical and legal challenges, which we turn to next.
Ethical, Legal, and Policy Implications
The rise of cognitive warfare – especially turbocharged by AI and neurotechnology – presents a host of ethical and legal dilemmas. Traditional laws of war (e.g. the Geneva Conventions) and norms of conflict were not designed with “attacks on the mind” in mind. One fundamental issue is the targeting of civilians. Cognitive warfare campaigns almost invariably target civilian populations (either broadly or in specific segments) because altering the adversary’s society and political environment is often the objective. This clashes with the principle of distinction in international humanitarian law, which prohibits direct attacks on civilians. Propaganda and psychological operations have long been a gray area; they are generally legal in peacetime and wartime up to a point, but where is the line between permissible information influence and an illegal attack causing harm? For example, deliberately spreading disinformation that causes panic (as in the banking panic scenario) could be viewed as an attack on civilian well-being. Yet, because no kinetic force is used, it falls into a legal void. There is an argument that cognitive attacks that inflict significant suffering or harm (e.g. inciting violence, or inducing mental illness or self-harm on a population) might violate the spirit of the laws of war or human rights law. However, enforcement is exceedingly difficult – proving causation and intent in the psychological realm is much harder than for a dropped bomb.
Another ethical concern is the manipulation of truth and free will. Cognitive warfare by nature involves deception, propaganda, and psychological manipulation. Democracies face a moral quandary: to defend themselves, do they adopt similar tactics (fighting fire with fire in the info sphere) at the cost of eroding the very values of truth and transparency they uphold? For instance, should a democratic government ever use deepfakes for benign psyops against extremist groups? Most liberal societies would currently say no, as it violates norms of honesty and could backfire by undermining public trust if revealed. Moreover, if AI systems start engaging in “automated subversion” – acting without direct human orders to spread disinformation – accountability becomes murky. Can a nation be held responsible for an autonomous AI agent that runs amok in the information environment? These questions echo the broader AI ethics debate, now applied to warfare: ensuring meaningful human control, responsibility, and compliance with intent. As of now, “there are no established ethical considerations and doctrines” fully governing cognitive warfare
innovationhub-act.org
innovationhub-act.org. NATO researchers point out that this field expanded so rapidly with digital tech that policy has lagged behind
innovationhub-act.org
innovationhub-act.org. The ethical framework is essentially playing catch-up to real-world tactics already in use.
The use of neurotechnological and biomedical tools for cognitive purposes raises additional legal questions. Would deploying a CRISPR-engineered “emotion virus” that makes people apathetic violate the Biological Weapons Convention? Quite possibly – it likely qualifies as a biological agent – but what if it’s an incapacitant that only affects cognition (akin to a psychotropic drug weapon)? The Chemical Weapons Convention does ban chemical incapacitating agents, and arguably a bioweapon causing cognitive damage would be covered. However, what about non-chemical means like directed energy that cause no visible injury but induce, say, temporary memory loss or panic? There is no explicit treaty on directed-energy neuroweapons. Scholars like Giordano call for updating arms control categorizations to account for such novel neuroweapons and to establish oversight on dual-use neuroscience research
pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov. Already, some nations have included gene editing in WMD threat lists due to its potential misuse for such purposes
pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov.
Privacy and human rights are also at stake. Cognitive warfare techniques often involve mass data collection about target populations (to personalize messages) and surveillance of online behavior. This can conflict with privacy rights. Moreover, if states ramp up their cognitive security, they may implement more aggressive monitoring of their own information space – straying into censorship. Free expression becomes a casualty if every contentious view is seen as a possible foreign influence to be quashed. Democracies must balance resilience to manipulation with preservation of open discourse. On the defensive side, one policy debate is how to educate and inoculate the public against cognitive manipulation. Programs in digital literacy, critical thinking, and even “mind fitness” (being aware of cognitive biases) are being considered. Ethically, such programs are positive if done transparently, but one could imagine governments attempting to “immunize” the public by quietly feeding them counter-propaganda – which starts to resemble the manipulations we seek to fight.
Internationally, there is no clear consensus or legal regime specifically for cognitive warfare. Acts like election interference via disinformation arguably violate principles of non-intervention in sovereign affairs, but attribution and response are diplomatically fraught. Some experts suggest new agreements or norms are needed – for instance, perhaps states could agree not to target each other’s health sector with disinformation (given the COVID experience), or not to use deepfakes of each other’s leaders (to avoid inadvertent escalation). However, enforcement of such norms would be challenging. It is also worth noting that cognitive warfare can prevent or reduce violence in some cases – for example, if done to “deter intervention” or “win without fighting” by convincing an adversary’s population to oppose war
moderndiplomacy.eu
. This resonates with Sun Tzu’s ideal of winning through influencing enemy will rather than slaughter. Ethically, one might argue that if cognitive means can achieve outcomes with less bloodshed, they could be seen as a more humane form of conflict (provided they don’t cross into atrocity like inciting genocide, which is clearly illegal). The counter-argument is that manipulating minds can be deeply injurious to personal autonomy and societal harmony, thus a different but still serious harm.
On the policy front, NATO and allied countries are now actively grappling with cognitive warfare. NATO has stood up initiatives like the Cognitive Warfare Exploratory Concept and held high-level symposia on “Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare”
researchgate.net
. The alliance recognizes that it must develop defensive measures, which include public awareness campaigns, strengthening of democratic institutions against subversion, training military personnel in cognitive security, and improving intelligence-sharing on influence operations. For example, a NATO technical report recommends developing a comprehensive training curriculum to “increase awareness regarding the impact of psychological deception” and to inculcate resilience at all levels of military and political leadership
publications.tno.nl
publications.tno.nl. Indeed, studies found even information operations specialists were not significantly more savvy about manipulation than average civilians
publications.tno.nl
publications.tno.nl – highlighting a need for education. Governments are also working with social media companies and AI firms to detect and disrupt foreign disinformation networks (though this raises questions about state influence over tech platforms).
In terms of doctrine, armed forces are updating their concepts to incorporate the cognitive dimension. The U.S. DoD, for instance, in 2020 included “information” as the seventh joint function (alongside maneuver, firepower, etc.), reflecting the recognition that controlling information and perception is part of modern operations. Some have suggested establishing dedicated “cognitive warfare units” or commands that unify cyber, psyops, electronic warfare, and intelligence to fight on this front as a coordinated whole. Legal advisors are being forced to consider at what point does a sustained disinformation campaign constitute an “armed attack” or use of force under international law, potentially warranting self-defense. These are uncharted waters: if, hypothetically, an AI-driven cognitive attack caused massive civil unrest in a country, could that country lawfully respond with conventional force against the perpetrator? The answer is unclear, demonstrating the gap between strategic reality and legal frameworks.
In conclusion, the advent of AI-empowered cognitive warfare is challenging existing ethical norms and legal regimes. It urges a rethinking of security to include cognitive security as equally important as territorial security. Policymakers will need to delineate red lines (e.g. outlawing certain deceptive tactics, at least by policy if not by treaty) and invest in societal resilience. Ethically, democratic societies must strive to defend against cognitive attacks without undermining the open values that make them worth defending in the first place – a delicate balance requiring transparency, public engagement, and education rather than purely clandestine counter-operations. The next decade will likely see rapid evolution in both the methods of cognitive warfare and the frameworks to control it.
Conclusion
Cognitive warfare represents a paradigm shift in conflict, one that “uses the human mind as its battlefield” and leverages any and all means – informational, technical, psychological, and biological – to achieve its aims
blackbird.ai
. Automation and AI have amplified this mode of warfare, enabling influence operations of unprecedented scale and sophistication. The integration of humans and machines, from AI-run bot armies to potential brain-computer interfaces, is blurring the line between the organic and the technological in warfare. As we have seen, military planners are increasingly incorporating cognitive effects into their operations, and adversaries are already exploiting the seams of open societies with automated disinformation and strategic propaganda.
Confronting these threats will require an equally innovative and integrated response. Frameworks like UnCODE and the cognitive kill chain help in conceptualizing and anticipating attack paths, while human-machine teaming and AI tools will be indispensable in mounting a defense. However, technology is not a silver bullet – indeed, an over-reliance on AI without human context can be perilous in a domain as nuanced as human cognition. Thus, investing in human capital – training leaders, soldiers, and citizens to recognize and withstand cognitive manipulation – is paramount. Building a culture of resilience and media literacy is as crucial as deploying the latest algorithm to filter fake news. On the international stage, norms and perhaps new laws must evolve to govern cognitive conflict, lest it becomes a wild frontier where anything goes.
In a sense, cognitive warfare is a return to an ancient truth: war has always been, at its heart, a battle of wills and minds, as much as a clash of arms. What has changed is the medium and reach – digital networks and AI have made it possible to assault the mind with precision and scale never before seen. The challenge for the global community is to navigate this landscape responsibly: to harness the positive potential of AI and neuroscience for strengthening human decision-making and security, while guarding against their malicious use. As cognitive warfare “operates on a global stage” and is “essentially invisible” until its effects are felt
innovationhub-act.org
innovationhub-act.org, proactive and preemptive measures will be vital. In summary, cognitive warfare demands a holistic approach to defense – one that marries cutting-edge technology with deep understanding of human nature, upholds ethical standards, and reinforces the very cognitive strengths (critical thinking, informed citizenry, unity of purpose) that adversaries seek to erode
innovationhub-act.org
innovationhub-act.org.
Sources:
Ask, T. F., et al. (2024). The UnCODE System: A Neurocentric Systems Approach for Classifying the Goals and Methods of Cognitive Warfare
researchgate.net
researchgate.net. NATO HFM-361 Symposium.
Ask, T. F., & Knox, B. J. (2023). Cognitive Warfare and the Human Domain: … Human Domain
sto.nato.int
. In Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare (NATO STO-TR-HFM-ET-356).
Claverie, B., & du Cluzel, F. (2022). “Cognitive Warfare”: The Advent of the Concept of “Cognitics” in Warfare. In Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance, 2:1–8
innovationhub-act.org
innovationhub-act.org.
du Cluzel, F. (2020). Cognitive Warfare (NATO Innovation Hub)
innovationhub-act.org
innovationhub-act.org.
Flemisch, F. (2023). Human-Machine Teaming Towards a Holistic Understanding of Cognitive Warfare. In Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare (NATO STO-TR-HFM-ET-356)
researchgate.net
.
Hutchins, E., Cloppert, M., & Amin, R. (2010). Intelligence-Driven CND Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains
lockheedmartin.com
.
Le Guyader, H. (2022). Cognitive Domain: A Sixth Domain of Operations? In Cognitive Warfare: Future of Cognitive Dominance, 3:1–6
innovationhub-act.org
.
Masakowski, Y. R., & Blatny, J. M. (Eds.) (2023). Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare (NATO STO-TR-HFM-ET-356).
DiEuliis, D., & Giordano, J. (2017). Why Gene Editors Like CRISPR/Cas May Be a Game-Changer for Neuroweapons
pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov. Health Security, 15(3).
McCarron, M. (2024). Battlespace of Mind: AI, Cybernetics and Information Warfare
trinedaythejourneypodcast.buzzsprout.com
.
Additionally cited: NATO ACT (2022) Cognitive Warfare Concept
act.nato.int
act.nato.int; Bond, S. (2023) NPR report on fake Pentagon image
npr.org
npr.org; Coombs, A. (2024) MWI report on AI in info ops
mwi.westpoint.edu
mwi.westpoint.edu; etc.